

12 Apropos Exceptionalism: Imperial Location and Comparative Histories of South Africa and the United States*

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[Stanley] wanted 'to punish Bumbireh with the power of a father punishing a stubborn and disobedient son.' The method he chose was to return to Bumbireh and empty box after box of Snider bullets into the ranks of the tribesmen while staying just out of range of their spears and arrows. He claimed to have shot down thirty-three men and wounded a hundred, many fatally. 'We had great cause to feel gratitude.' The 'victory' had put everyone into excellent heart. 'We made a brave show as we proceeded along the coast, the canoes thirty-seven in number containing 500 men paddling to the sound of sonorous drums and the cheering tones of the bugle, the English, the American and Zanzibar flags flying gaily in union with a most animating scene.'

Thomas Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa* (1991)

By St Mungo, is there any justice-giustizia in the Globe? Or, is it survival of the fittest and yet another man gone West?

G.V. Desani, *All About H. Hatterr* (1986)

Artist and anti-apartheid activist Breyten Breytenbach has described his forebodings about the direction in which South Africa has been moving recently. In a nutshell, these stem from his fear that having concentrated their efforts on racial oppression radicals may now be unable or unwilling to combat the dangers of a centralised nation state. Breytenbach believes that the fight against apartheid and the hierarchical division of peoples on the basis of race and ethnicity in some ways allowed the notion of the state to go uncontested. The end of capturing the state from the National Party led anti-apartheid forces to overlook the negatives associated with the state itself. For Breytenbach it has become necessary 'to put in my plea for doubt and questioning, diversity, the maintenance of our "Ho Chi Minh trail" of

underground tunnels of memory and resistance, tolerance, mixing, blending, crankiness, existentialism, humanism, anarchism . . . To avoid like the plague the tyranny of "being on the side of the angels."¹ Living in a moment of 'historical acceleration', as Breytenbach calls the present in South Africa, still requires that power and those who wield it continue to be opposed.

Breytenbach's comments represent a political shift made possible by the great transformation that has occurred in South Africa over the last ten years and in turn reflects the potential for a reinterpretation of the history of this region. On the basis of his fears, one could argue that if the next twenty or thirty years witness a struggle over federalism in the Republic and the pitting of new groups against the centralised state, then a new interpretation focusing on state formation may gain ascendancy over one founded solely on racial categorisation.² Certainly, the increasingly violent conflict between the African National Congress and Mangosuthu Gatscha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement, suggests that a more nuanced interpretation of racial division is required than one would expect given the centrality of the white/black division enshrined in apartheid.³ As other political transformations occur in South Africa we can expect historiographical changes similar in magnitude to those witnessed in the United States over the last one hundred years in the interpretations of the Civil War and Reconstruction.⁴

The beginnings of a reassessment of South African history can be found in the analysis of the National Party's success in the Western Cape in the first democratic election of 1994.⁵ William Finnegan has shown that this victory was not the result of shortsightedness among 'so-called coloureds' voting for their former oppressors simply because of their racial antipathy for black South Africans. Not only were the 'coloureds' political decisions made on the basis of National Party offerings and the failures of the African National Congress (so that their votes were as reasoned and sensible perhaps as any vote cast in the United States), there were important historical antecedents to the coalition refashioned between 'coloureds' and Afrikaners. Indeed, according to Finnegan, 'relations between the Afrikaners, the self-consciously "white" descendants of the early Dutch settlers, and the coloureds have for centuries been both tangled and intimate'. Drawing on the recent work of historian Hermann Giliomee, he continues:

There is even a vivid precedent for the National Party's recent interest in the coloured vote. . . . During the 1920s, in the relatively liberal Cape province, coloured and African men who met a property qualification

had the right to vote . . . and 'non-whites' actually made up more than a quarter of the voters in the Cape Peninsula. The National Party, fearing an influx of immigrants from England who might eventually outnumber Afrikaans-speaking whites, embraced 'brown Afrikaners' as their natural allies, and succeeded in capturing enough of the coloured vote to win the 1924 election against the relatively pro-British South African Party of Jan Christian Smuts . . . The gesture turned out to be one of pure expediency, and the Nationalists soon abandoned their coloured supporters in their pursuit of white-supremacist Afrikaners of the northern provinces.⁶

The point is that such events, almost forgotten, can be dredged up from the deepest recesses of historical memory to explain current trends and form the basis of new interpretations.

Once such new interpretations gain ground and shifts occur in South African historiography the need for reappraisal of conclusions based on comparative analysis becomes imperative. Certain assumptions about change in the United States and the nature of American pluralism are founded in comparisons with nations that are believed incapable of such change. Radically transform the unchangeable and the extent of American pluralism may need reassessment. The belief that South Africa was incapable of change along the lines of race has been shown to be false and historians have been forced to discard the assumption that apartheid was so entrenched that only a bloody war, in which white people fought to the last ditch, or a nuclear weapon would bring about its demise (along with similar theories created to explain or keep vital the continuing conflicts in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, and to account for the immovable 'Iron Curtain' in Europe).⁷ Historians like Hermann Giliomee are now looking for the roots of this transformation in South Africa, the weaknesses within the system of apartheid, and the system's failure to sustain its hold on the very party that had fashioned it.⁸ Almost inevitably, the products of such work will lead to the reassessment of issues of race as they are understood and lived in the United States. After all, one of the most comforting things for many Americans ever since the civil rights transformation of the 1950s and 1960s, has been the fact that they were able to bring about a 'peaceful' reformation of racial practices when South Africa (which not coincidentally became a focus of black and white American political activity once social equality began to appear more difficult to achieve in the United States) seemed so incapable of embracing such liberal change.

With the potential for such interpretive shifts in mind, it is important to

note the re-emergence of notions of the 'unworthy poor', 'culture of poverty', and 'blaming the poor' (particularly single mothers), as organising principles for distributing welfare in the United States.⁹ For while South Africa undergoes rapid change the United States seems increasingly entrenched on the issues of race, immigration and poverty. Alan Brinkley has conveyed a clear sense of the mire in which ideas surrounding welfare have always been stuck:

even at moments of great optimism, unacknowledged preconceptions – about politics, about gender, and about morality – can shape and distort the boldest programs. Understanding the ways in which damaging and invidious distinctions have crept into our welfare system is a first step toward thinking about ways to remove them.¹⁰

When one remembers that such 'damaging and invidious distinctions' about the poor are clearly delineated in Edmund Morgan's *American Slavery, American Freedom*¹¹ and were very much a part of both the English colonial experience and the republican experiment, one can begin to comprehend that for all the political shifts in the United States (Jacksonian democracy, emancipation, women's suffrage, and civil rights to name a few) not much has changed for some people. And now that the heady days of November 1992 – a time when many imagined that President Clinton might bring about reform in health care and other social programmes – have been replaced by November 1994's hangover, as Newt Gingrich and Co. (using history as their most potent brew) proclaim a new war on those not welcome and those 'not pulling their weight', the endurance of pluralism and the potential for liberal change in the United States appears less likely to be a rule of history than a luxury enjoyed by the lucky few.¹² Thus, the rhetoric of the War on Drugs and 'the war on welfare', the respectable reception given to *The Bell Curve*, the passage of California's Proposition 187, and the various stages of the Rodney King incident – the beating, the initial acquittal of the police involved, and the riots throughout South Central Los Angeles – suggest that such pessimism about future political change and its impact on poor inner-city dwellers and 'illegal' immigrants wherever they reside is warranted.¹³

A larger question arises from this awareness of contemporary political and historiographical shifts: how is it that the comparative study of the United States and South Africa never revealed the possibility of such shifts? Much work has been undertaken comparing South Africa and the United States, mainly concerned with their systems of slavery, segregation, and the nature of their discriminatory labour markets.¹⁴ This literature tends to dichotomise the two societies, emphasising the entrenched nature

of the racial system in South Africa as compared to the more malleable system of the United States.¹⁵ While no one can be held accountable for their inability to predict the almost unforeseeable, the extent to which the two societies have been described as moving along different trajectories does suggest that comparative methodologies need to be reconsidered. Before turning the focus onto the United States and South Africa, therefore, some discussion of one of the limitations of this process of comparison is necessary.

COMPARATIVELY SPEAKING

The many wars that have been fought in Europe since 1855, and are likely to be fought during the next twenty years, have or will have for one of their causes the discovery of Sanskrit. Though in itself this is by no means a very gratifying result, still I allude to it to simply show how deeply the Europeans have been influenced by the new ideas.

R.G. Bhandarkar, 'The Critical, Comparative and Historical Method of Inquiry' (1888)

The most severe limitations of comparative literature have been its national and nationalist bent.¹⁶ The unit of analysis under comparison is, generally speaking, the nation (or proxies thereof).¹⁷ As such, there is a tendency among comparativists to compare large social structures, ideologies, or organisations to explain the nature of the American variant. The desire is to use some other nation's history to help explain 'American Slavery', 'American race relations', 'American working-class formation or class consciousness', and so on.¹⁸ That there might be connections between these American forms and those others being compared is either ignored or not taken sufficiently into account; nor is the fact there might be differences within the United States that defy the label 'American' and lead one to reconsider its usage.¹⁹

Problems related to this national focus are compounded when nationalist assumptions are used to determine the ways in which another society is viewed. This can be explained most effectively by considering the two most common comparisons undertaken with the United States: those with Britain and South Africa – the former comparison made to highlight differences relating to class, the latter to reveal differences over race. This nation-based bifurcation of comparative analysis, with class on one side and race on the other, is particularly problematic here because for much of the period dealt with in these comparisons South Africa was a part of

the British Empire. Consequently, any comparison with either Britain or South Africa ought to go beyond the boundaries of the nation state to understand the larger dimensions of the imperial system.

Comparisons with either metropolitan Britain or colonies like South Africa in isolation veil as much as they reveal. First, a comparison of the United States with Britain falls victim to a category of class that is so constructed (based on free white labour) as to hide both colonised labour in the British case and slaves and Indians (among others) in the American case.²⁰ Not surprisingly, the class system of Britain appears 'peculiar' for its absence of ethnic divisions, its 'Englishness', while that of the United States appears 'exceptional' for its constant addressing of racial and ethnic divisions (once slaves become freed people and levels of immigration rose).²¹ Second, a comparison of the United States with places like South Africa, undertaken because the latter shared a system of slavery or other systems of racial discrimination, falls victim to a category of race that is so constructed as to hide free labour. Ignoring the manner in which understandings of racial slavery in both the US and the British Empire changed in relation to transformations in the experiences of 'free' white male labourers (and vice versa) leads to a reliance on static, nation-centred interpretations of race. As a result South African race relations appear unchanging and American race relations pluralistic, simply because the former society more closely resembles the rigid (and economically 'irrational') system believed to exist in slavery, while the latter society seems, for all its inequalities, to enshrine the doctrines of 'free labor'. The fact that the same assumptions about arduous and devalued labour (and who should perform it) prevail in both countries can be overlooked, even when the experiences for those who do this work and the assumptions about them (that they are somehow inferior) are similar. Finally, both kinds of comparisons (constructed as they are around racial/class questions) will overlook issues and connections relating to gender. The manner in which both class and race are categories with severe gender inflections will be deemed merely incidental to the larger comparative focus.²²

When the United States is compared with former British colonies seen as part of an imperial framework, in other words when the existence of what C.A. Bayly calls an 'imperial meridian' is recognised, two things become apparent: American working-class formation around ethnicity, race, and gender is not exceptional and American institutions and ideologies have developed around their own 'imperial meridian'.²³ Bayly asserts that imperialist discourse was not confined to overseas ventures, so that the manner in which a large section of the British Isles was brought together into a single political unit was very much imperial.²⁴ In order to understand the

ways in which people were incorporated into the society of London, or more generally of England, it is vital to look beyond 'the metropole'. Expatriate English, Scots and Welsh officials and settlers moved back and forth between 'periphery' and 'metropole', and along the way were influenced and sometimes accompanied by 'non-Britons' (Afrikaners, South Asians, Jews, and Africans to name a few). Moreover, as many Scots demonstrated, movement up the metropolitan social scale often could be accomplished most easily by being recognised for achievements at the periphery.²⁵ Further, understandings of empire helped to shape the ways people conceived of divisions in their locality and were evident in both their consumption patterns and what they read.²⁶

If an imperial meridian is important for comprehension of British history, how much more so is it for the interpretation of the history of the United States? While the United States is seldom seen in imperial terms, imperialism has been as central to the development of the United States as a single, powerful nation state, as it was to the emergence of other imperial nation states – Great Britain, Spain, Japan, France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Russia. All imperial nations bring together regionally and ethnically diverse peoples into political units according to a more or less hierarchical logic that privileges some sections of the state, while parcelling out benefits unevenly to other sections. The American analogue for the Scottish in the British Empire has been the Scotch-Irish, who very clearly saw 'the Birth of the American Nation' as a Scotch-Irish confection;²⁷ the 'frontier' and plantations provided locations that could be easily inflected with imperial and imperialist discourse; and similar consumption and reading patterns were to be found in the United States as those described by Edward Said for Britain.²⁸ When people, objects, and ideas are compared not in isolation, but in their imperial contexts, differences that may at first seem stark end up being shaded by an all-enveloping imperial fog.

Comparative studies, then, have not undermined exceptionalist arguments, and because they have generally compared two nations or two national types (American vs. South African slavery) they have shared an analytical frame with exceptionalist theories. Comparative studies of South Africa and the United States, like Cell's and Fredrickson's, have made explicit arguments that were already implicit because their authors have conformed to the presumption that national histories with clear, uncontested boundaries exist and should be compared.²⁹ Where national histories intersect and where those boundaries are contested (where they are themselves products of particular historical and historiographical conflicts) has often remained unexplored. Thus, while we can profit from comparing

nations, such comparisons have to be undertaken in the knowledge that the nations may have histories that are intertwined (perhaps shaping the way their national histories have been conceived and written), that they may be part of larger imperial systems, and that regional and institutional differences or practices may be present in both countries that make comparison at another level of analysis besides the nation more appropriate. In short, comparativists must be careful not to reify and give transhistorical character to something that is, in spite of its ability to mobilise people, only historically contingent.

The remainder of this paper, then, attempts to use comparative history to broaden the outlines of American history and to move beyond the mire of nationalist exceptionalism. The comparative lens used is a variable one; now zoom, now wide-angled, never soft-focused, the lens can be altered according to the objects being observed. I am not attempting to disprove American exceptionalism by undertaking a systematic comparison of the United States and another nation, showing the similarities between the two histories. Doing so would merely reify the two narratives selected, and any similarities found would still beg the question whether or not the other nation was similar only because it was also exceptional. Instead, South African history is here appropriated or exploited selectively to reveal both the connections between some American and South African historical narratives (and by implication those of other countries and regions), and the ways in which nationalist narratives can be broken down into smaller units of analysis (individuals, organisations, cities, or regions) to produce different comparative results. The next section, then, will examine a few of the areas of overlap in American and Southern African histories, while the final section will examine similarities in the imperial locations of American populists and Afrikaner voortrekkers.

AFTER THE GOLD RUSH

O, my shoes are Japanese
 These trousers are English, if you please
 On my head, red Russian hat –
 My heart's Indian for all that.

(hit number 'Meera Joota Hia Japani' from the film *Shri 420*)³⁰

In *Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood*, Rob Nixon insists 'on the wider links between the [South African] discourses of absolute rupture, authenticity, racial purity, and ethnic nationalism on the one hand and, on the

other, the idioms of cosmopolitanism, transculturation, hybridity, and internationalism'. Nixon reveals the 'diverse ties between South African culture and the world beyond its borders' during the period between apartheid's implementation in 1948 and South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994, most especially the influence of Hollywood and American writers and musicians.³¹ This intersection of South African and American histories can be seen going back well into the nineteenth century. Two linkages that come to mind immediately are the common origins (both in ideas and sometimes in personnel) of the two region's missionaries, and the overlapping of mining and prostitution capitalists in both countries.³²

The common origins of the two regions' missionaries is not altogether surprising when one remembers that both Americans and British were captivated by David Livingstone's work in Africa, or at least Henry Morton Stanley's rendering of that work. It was Stanley, after all, who made the call for missionaries in his widely-circulated articles in the *Daily Telegraph* in Britain and James Gordon Bennett's *New York Herald* in the United States, and while this did not begin missionary work in Africa, it most certainly did contribute to its increase.³³

In the process of describing contemporary views of segregation, John W. Cell has provided a very thought-provoking picture of the work of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in South Africa at the turn of the century.³⁴ Focusing on the work of Bishops Henry McNeil Turner and Levi J. Coppin in South Africa, Cell describes the attempts of the Philadelphia-based denomination to extend its missionary work to Southern Africa, after having previously worked only in the United States' own African project, Liberia. Understanding the nature of this work in South Africa requires knowing the degree to which it grew out of the very successful expansion of the AME Church throughout the American South during and after the Civil War – work that was also spearheaded by Turner. Coppin's and Turner's attitudes towards Africa's 'raw natives' replicated their view of Southern freed peoples, who needed to be 'uplifted' to the stage of civilisation reached by African-Americans in northeastern cities.³⁵ While there were clearly dimensions to this missionary work that made it different from similar work undertaken by white missionaries, the similarity of their attitudes to those held by white Christians should not be overlooked.

The AME Church's success in its Southern endeavours contributed to the belief that it could have the same impact outside the United States, not only in Africa but also Cuba and Haiti, winning over not just heathens but Catholics. Southern successes also contributed greatly to Turner's persuasiveness when he promoted the idea of repatriation to Africa, since the

Bishop could claim not only that African-Americans ought to leave the United States, but that if they did so, they would become leaders in the mission to 'uplift backward peoples', fulfilling God's original purpose in bringing Africans as slaves to America. Even when enthusiasm for leaving the United States waned in the late 1890s (coinciding, for a number of reasons, with the Spanish-American War), these ideas about employing the unique experience of African-Americans to give 'kindness and civilization' to their 'less fortunate' brethren remained strong.³⁶

Further, the AME connection with South Africa was only one of many such linkages between African-Americans and South Africans. George Shepperson and Thomas Pricè's excellent biography of John Chilembwe shows the influence of both an English missionary and black church leaders in the United States in the lead up to the Nyasaland uprising of 1915.³⁷ Similarly, Brian Wilan's biography of Sol Plaatje reveals strong links between this early African Nationalist and leading African-Americans.³⁸ Such connections reinforced social developments that were occurring simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic, an example of which was the 'moralizing of leisure time'.³⁹

Indeed, contact with South Africa and Liberia helped African-Americans like Alexander Crummell develop an understanding of race that incorporated all 'Negroes' into one racial group, and allowed leaders like himself to 'speak for [the race]' and 'to plot its future'. Representing 'the race' was made problematic, however, by the fact that such leaders felt that African culture was, in Kwame Anthony Appiah's words, 'anarchic, unprincipled, ignorant, defined by the absence of all the positive traits of civilization as "savage"'.⁴⁰ Such impressions of race and Africa were shared by the leading African-American intellectuals of the day, from African Methodist bishops who served in Liberia and South Africa (like William Henry Heard, Levi J. Coppin, Robert R. Wright, Jr and John Gregg) to Edward Wilmot Blyden, Alexander Crummell, and even, with some modifications, W.E.B. Du Bois.⁴¹ Race defined in this way could be employed to create a 'Black Atlantic' (as Paul Gilroy has suggested)⁴² through Negritude and Pan-Africanism, or promote racial solidarity and Black Nationalism in the United States. But, such negative assumptions about African culture could also divide, 'establishing' the uniqueness of African-American experiences as compared to Africans, and of metropolitan African-Americans as compared to Southern 'greenhorns' (who, the urbanites maintained, had not travelled so far from their African condition).⁴³ Ironically, without connections and the commonality of experiences, arguing for exceptionalism with regard to the experiences of African-Americans would have been more difficult.

Capitalists in the nineteenth century were a transitory and diverse group of people, and they often traversed large sections of the globe carrying their imperial visions of capital and labour with them. This was particularly the case among mining folk. The story of Edward Hammond Hargreaves's return to Sydney from the California goldfields in January of 1851, followed by his discovery of gold in May of that year and the beginning of the New South Wales gold rush, is well known to most Australians.⁴⁴ Many other miners followed Hargreaves's example. According to Charles van Onselen, 'As the price of tin fell in Cornwall, and as some Australian goldfields faltered and failed, so many of the "hard rock men" set their sights on new targets and made their way to the Rand mines which, by [the 1890s], had been expanding for more than a decade.'⁴⁵ Migrating miners brought with them ideas and experience that would help shape economic and social developments in areas of the world from California, to Australia, the Yukon, and Witwatersrand.⁴⁶ The transitory nature of this population is revealed in the fact that in 1912, according to C.W. de Kiewiet, only 35 per cent of the white miners had been born in South Africa.⁴⁷

Given the presence of these migrants among mining capitalists, it is not surprising that groups at the lower end of the opportunity scale faced similar experiences in places as far apart as California and Witwatersrand. There were important differences in the types of deposits in the world's goldfields that made for some significant variations in experience, but these were in the initial stages of mining. The California and Australian gold deposits were alluvial or surface deposits, so the independent miner with a pick, shovel, and prospecting pan could make a profit at first. Soon, however, these sources were exhausted and it became necessary for miners to blast away at rock and learn methods to extract the gold. These required capital investment and encouraged consolidation of businesses. In South Africa, however, there were no alluvial deposits. Mining development on the Witwatersrand occurred without the widespread experience of individuals staking their claim and then being replaced by larger corporate entities. Whether or not the leap to 'company mining' was entirely a result of the nature of the gold deposits, as de Kiewiet argued, or the result of the later discovery of South African gold during a time of emerging monopoly capitalism (particularly in the world's mining fields) as Duncan Innes argues, is not important here.⁴⁸ What is important is that Euro-American magnates were able to establish a firm foothold in the region and could establish tried-and-true labour practices.⁴⁹

As such, attempts by more elite miners to push out the smaller mining enterprises, to rationalise the minefields, and consolidate power in their own hands, were very similar in both California and South Africa. In the

process, many poor white Americans and Afrikaners (respectively) lost their footholds in this kind of production, as did the Chinese in California and Africans on the Witwatersrand. In both instances, the attempts to exclude these two 'races' were used to consolidate the power of a small minority of whites, increasing racial antipathy and competition among members of the lower classes, and leading to similar kinds of racial and nationalist politics in both regions with similar consequences. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1881, pushed for (among others) by Californian working classes, and the South African Mines and Works Act of 1911, which established the colour bar in mining, were the two most significant legislative initiatives from these connected histories.⁵⁰

That one of the most successful conglomerations to emerge from this series of gold and other mineral rushes, was the Anglo-American Corporation in South Africa, is a memorial to the intersectedness of these histories. Further, the manner in which the economic boycott of South Africa had such a significant impact over the last twenty years, where in many other instances boycotts have been ineffective, is also a testament to the way in which South African and American histories have overlapped.

Another view of such intersection can be found in the histories of prostitution. Van Onselen's *New Babylon* is particularly illuminating in this regard, and his stories of the Bowery Boys in South Africa are worth repeating at length here. From late 1898, according to van Onselen, 'hundreds of "undesirables"', 'including scores of Jewish pimps and prostitutes', abandoned the Bowery in New York City and made their way to England. London, however, proved to be a disappointment to these migrants, owing to the fact that a well-developed trade for prostitution already existed and profits were therefore limited.⁵¹ Thus, according to van Onselen,

when these well-travelled Russians and Poles heard of the exciting new opportunities developing in the southern hemisphere, they did not hesitate to move yet again. While some of their colleagues in the trade opted for South America, many of the former New York pimps and prostitutes decided to make their way to the goldfields of Kruger's republic.

An 'advance guard' of this American contingent was already involved in prostitution on the Witwatersrand as early as 1895, but over the next two years, 'their numbers were substantially augmented by the arrival of dozens of the more professional "white slavers" and their entourages from London'.⁵²

Once they established themselves on the Witwatersrand, the Bowery Boys used intimidation in the form of 'blackmail, bribery and corruption,

directed at the Morality Squad', to ensure that their brothels were protected while their competitors were plagued by law enforcement. In other words, tactics that had recently been so successful on the Bowery were now used to advantage in Johannesburg. Van Onselen goes on to describe the rise of Joe Silver, a Polish-American arriving from London in 1898, who became 'King of the Pimps in Johannesburg'. By ascending to the presidency of the American Club in 1898, Silver was able to maintain control of the Witwatersrand until his arrest and conviction a year later (when an English consortium took over prostitution). After his release from prison following the outbreak of the Boer War, he established his influence in other regions.

Beyond the similarities in personnel, there were also connections in labour markets. New York was not merely linked to Johannesburg, it was also connected with umpteen other cities around the globe. George J. Kneeland's study, *Commercialized Prostitution in New York City*, published in 1913, reveals this quite clearly. Appendix XIV, entitled 'Shipping Women', tells us of one person, 'X 47, alias X 47-a, who is part owner in X 46 West 25th Street'. According to Kneeland, '[He] has had his women in England, Russia, South Africa, Dallas, Texas, and Seattle, Washington. He travels back and forth between South Africa and New York.'⁵³ This man was just one of many who moved prostitutes from places all over the United States to Brazil, China, Argentina along with the places frequented by X 47-a's prostitute. Indeed, what is peculiar about the Bowery Boys locating themselves in Johannesburg, is not that Americans were profiting from prostitution among the mining populations, but the fact that, as a result of Progressive squeamishness in New York, pimps were being forced to migrate to the point of production. Once in Johannesburg, they were forced to compete with pimps chased out of London and Paris.

The common denominator among those places to which American pimps sent their prostitutes was fast economic growth occurring in a particular area which attracted disproportionately male populations of migrants (often indentured labourers) for whom some 'servicing' was believed necessary.⁵⁴ Consequently, it is no surprise to find that California and Witwatersrand developed very similar markets for prostitution. And just as the similarities between the mining capitalists gave rise to similar experiences for the labourers in the mines, so the similarity in methods and personnel among the pimps gave rise to similar experiences for the prostitutes.

A transformation is clearly evident at the end of the nineteenth century in the world of Johannesburg's prostitution. The early prostitutes, according to van Onselen, were 'daughters of South Africa's old proletariat', but

soon, as the account of the Bowery Boys suggests, they would be outnumbered by new arrivals from Europe and America.⁵⁵ There is an air of the pre-industrial attached to the work habits of the early prostitutes, who 'chose to attach themselves to any one of the hundreds of canteens or hotels which abounded in the mining town'.⁵⁶ These work habits were gone by the time that (what we will call) 'company prostitution' took hold in the mid-1890s. There can be less disagreement about the origins of this 'company' system than in the case of monopoly capitalism in the mining industry. Louise White has asserted that 'men and male control enter prostitution only after the state does',⁵⁷ and it is clear that the increasing criminalisation and persecution of prostitutes forced women to seek 'protection' from pimps and brothels.⁵⁸ Before the Progressive purges of the 1890s in London and New York, pimps had bought off corrupt police officials, particularly those associated with Tammany Hall, thereby making it very difficult for the individual to ply her trade independently.⁵⁹ The profits that this system generated were such that the methods of corruption and intimidation could be transferred to 'frontier' towns with relative ease cementing an imperial labour market that resembled those found among the miners and plantation labourers.⁶⁰

Even within this 'company' system experiences were wide-ranging for prostitutes (as experiences for labourers have been) ranging from the worst kinds of exploitation to experiences of empowerment. Van Onselen's description of Fanny Kreslo is clearly a case of the former, and one that Progressives dwelled on in their endeavours to bring 'morality' into the affairs of the city. Kreslo was a 15-year-old Lithuanian girl who, in 1898, was offered employment as a shop assistant in London, but on arriving in London learned that her employer had moved to the Rand. Having left Lithuania, and any people who might have advised her against following her employer to South Africa, she was easily persuaded to leave London. On arrival in Johannesburg, she was pressed into prostitution, until she was 'freed' in 1899 as a result of President Kruger's crackdown on the Bowery Boys.⁶¹

But van Onselen also describes incidences where women gained some sense of empowerment from prostitution, and it was not unusual for a woman to be running a brothel, working as a pimp, a 'madam', a pimp's 'prostitute/wife', a 'modiste', a 'procuress' or acting independently as 'streetwalkers' (who often were the women most despised, because they most obviously contested gender norms).⁶² Historians have been reluctant to recognise these women as being empowered, even of being workers as such, but it is nevertheless the case that in the range of possibilities open to women at the *fin-de-siècle* prostitution was not necessarily uniquely

exploitative.⁶³ And the stories of prostitutes in South Africa were linked to those of women outside the trade in sex, in paid and unpaid labour, and to other regions. Prostitutes' migration stories, from the most dismal to the most fortunate, were repeated for girls and young women drawn, or making their way, into prostitution all over the world.⁶⁴

Here the limits of agency become readily apparent. If prostitution is sex labour then the prostitutes' resistance can be seen as similar to that of other labourers. And yet, as Philippa Levine has argued,

the woman's identity as prostitute or potential prostitute was constructed *through* resistance. A prostitute woman by definition lived in defiance, in resistance – of the proper sphere of Woman, of the male order, of respectability, exposing the threat of unordered female sexuality which led to codifications of female sexuality. In short, resistance invited containment which prompted resistance – and new definitions were born.⁶⁵

As such, the very act of resistance, or the 'weapon of the weak', would be the very act or weapon that aided the social worker, government official, or other interested observer to find the woman in question guilty of the charge of 'looseness', 'coarseness', and so on. If this applies to the sex labourer, then so too can it apply to the labourer on the shop floor.⁶⁶ And where this is clear in the ordering of power in a city, it is even more so when the prostitute is located on the imperial terrain, and when ethnic groups endeavoured to situate themselves in relation to other groups according to the character of 'their women'.

The importance of prostitution in shaping migration experiences generally should not be underestimated. Not least, this was because so many migrants were engaged in prostitution. In San Francisco, for example, seven out of ten Chinese women were recorded as prostitutes in 1870, and until around 1907, there were believed to be 22.5 prostitutes to every 100 inhabitants in Chinatown.⁶⁷ If such numbers approximate the truth, then the fact of prostitution becomes central to Chinatown experience. And yet for those people who lived there prostitution may not have been considered a deviance of any sort, nor a life on the margins of respectability.⁶⁸ Once this is acknowledged, however, it becomes crucial to understand how normative experience was pushed to the margins so that it could become grist for the mills of moralising nationalisms. For one of the key features of nineteenth-century nationalism was the importance of women to its definition. Not only were women seen as the bearers and reproducers of culture, control over them was deemed central to determining the health and vitality of the group.⁶⁹ Du Bois's classic statement that the meaning of race lay in white 'ownership of women', which led to black men striving

to reassert their control in this domain, can be applied to the way immigrant leaders saw 'their own' women.⁷⁰ Controlling 'one's women' was crucial in an environment like the United States where the 'vitality' of an ethnic group was believed to depend on those women choosing a man of the same ethnicity.⁷¹

If Anne McClintock is correct that 'All nations depend on powerful constructions of gender', then control of prostitutes and any women who might be considered of 'loose morals' would almost inevitably concern those who wished to advance the cause of particular nations.⁷² Nationalists continually feared that the presence of such women reflected badly on their group as a whole. Thus, indentured labour migration from India to the British Caribbean and Africa was brought to an end once nationalists like Gopal Krishna Gokhale made the argument that national self-confidence and independence would never grow in India so long as the British maintained a system that led so many South Asian women into prostitution abroad.⁷³ Opposition to prostitution in California shows a similar appreciation among Chinese and Japanese nationalists of the inverse relationship between the 'success' of an ethnic group and the widespread association of that group with prostitution.⁷⁴ Often historians themselves have failed to see the contingent nature of this linkage and have readily accepted it as a barometer for determining immigrant fortunes in America. For example, Lynn Pan writes:

Prostitution . . . is another matter. Along with opium, the organized traffic in prostitutes was what gave the overseas Chinese such a bad name; there was scarcely an American comment on Chinatown, rarely a description of the Chinese community, that missed the chance to bring up the subject.⁷⁵

And, Pan continues, 'some of the American men really knew what they were talking about'. While it is unclear that such 'American' men could have had more than a one-sided impression of the lives and habits of Chinese prostitutes (and that controlled by the prostitute's ability to 'put something over on him'),⁷⁶ it is certainly clear from Pan that they were capable of basing assumptions about the Chinese as a whole on these partial transcripts. Thus an imperial bond could be cemented, that might otherwise have been difficult to forge, between Progressive reformer and ethnic nationalist.

The connections between histories that crossed the boundaries of the nation state often helped to define the ways in which those national histories would be perceived. African-American involvement in South Africa helped

contribute to American ideas about the 'backwardness' of Africans; Anglo-American capitalists' investment in the Republic would contribute to imperial notions about development and modernisation; and the differential abilities of nationalists to control 'their' women abroad would contribute both to the way nations were perceived by Euro-American imperialists knocking at their doors and the way those migrants would be viewed by the communities around the world in which they settled. In short, determining exceptional status is most easy when one is involved, directly or indirectly, in the shaping of that other society to which one's own is to be compared. Provided, of course, one can remain out of the range of spears and arrows.

OMAHA, SOMEWHERE IN MIDDLE AMERICA

Hey mister, if you're going to walk on water
You know you're only going walk all over me.

Adam Duritz, *Counting Crows* (Geffen Records, 1993)

Introductory courses and textbooks on US history invariably give some attention to American Indians. In the section on westward expansion, which generally follows Reconstruction and Redemption, historians will often describe the experiences of American Indians, sometimes describing them as the ultimate victims of this expansion. The behaviour of Euro-Americans may or may not be described as genocidal, and, even if so, more weight will be given to the importance of disease and the loss of the buffalo herds (whether or not their decimation is described as being undertaken deliberately to weaken Indian communities) in determining the decline of the Indians.⁷⁷ With the massacre of the Dakota Sioux at Wounded Knee, South Dakota in 1890, the story of the Indians will generally come to a close.⁷⁸

And with the end of this story, historians will turn to the plight of the farmers and the discussion of populism gets under way.⁷⁹ This story will be described as one of western farmers coming to terms with a nation now dominated by eastern capitalist interests. There is much disagreement among historians about the nature of populism. Were populists mid-westerners coming to terms with the closing frontier (Hicks), bigots fearful of blacks and Jews (Hofstadter), isolated rural dwellers in search of the camaraderie of populist rallies and picnics (Turner), creators of a democratic movement culture (Goodwyn), the generators of a class movement in opposition to capital (Pollack), or a pentecostal mix of all the above (McMath)?⁸⁰ There is enough disagreement here to provide some leeway for historians

in introductory courses or text books to present their own view. But whatever it is, this view will never situate populists in relation to the American Indians. None of the above-mentioned historians spared a reference for Indians (even when in the case of Hofstadter doing so might have strengthened his argument); why should we expect this of the generalist?⁸¹

What is the significance of this omission and the invisibility of American Indians in discussions of mid-western populism? Surely, the presence or recent withdrawal of Indians from those areas that were building 'a movement culture', as Goodwyn would have it, influenced their demands and their political rhetoric.⁸² While Goodwyn shrugs off the racism and anti-Semitism of Populists as something that they could not escape, rather than as something fundamental to their ideology, re-establishing the imperial location of Populists (in relation to Indians and the imperial expansion of the frontier) forces us to reassess some of the radical implications of their politics.

For, had Pierre-Joseph Proudhon been looking around in 1840 for proof of his famous axiom that 'Property is theft', he could have done no better than to observe the American frontier, where he would have seen the stripping of land from American Indians, followed by their relocation and the establishment of white American property in their place.⁸³ But, property's ultimate origins in displacement have been disguised in various legal transactions, in Constitutional practices, and in the process of history itself. Frederick Jackson Turner's claim that the frontier and the irrepressible American frontier spirit were to be found wherever there was 'free' land available, was just one part of this process of writing Indians out of the American narrative (and not coincidentally establishing the first systematic theory of American exceptionalism).⁸⁴

That some mid-western populists endorsed ideas of imperial expansion is clear. Ignatius Donnelly, the 'Voice of Minnesota' and author of the preamble to the People's Party's most important manifesto (the Omaha Platform), and a man who amassed his wealth from land speculation, was a great supporter of the expansion of the United States into the far northern regions of the continent. In 1869, as he was completing a term in Congress, he addressed the St. Paul Chamber of Commerce about such expansion. Donnelly believed that the settlement of the Red and Saskatchewan Valleys by Americans was dictated by Minnesota's 'geographical necessities' (or 'Manifest Destiny'). Hoping to reorient President Grant's policy away from expansion into the Caribbean basin and towards the contested terrain of Canada, Donnelly proposed that the American government come to the aid of the population of the Red River that was resisting British domination. By supporting those fighting for independence (as President

McKinley would later do in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898), 'we may', Donnelly hoped, 'within a few years, perhaps months, see the Stars and Stripes wave from Fort Garry, from the waters of Puget Sound, and along the shores of Vancouver'. For, according to the future populist, 'This country [Rupert's Land] belongs to us, and God speed the Fenian movement or any other movement that will bring it to us!'⁸⁵ It is not surprising, then, to find that his preamble to the Omaha Platform was founded on fundamentally imperial assumptions about the nature and destiny of American history.⁸⁶

Donnelly was also author of the Utopian novel *Caesar's Column*, written in 1890, in which Gabriel Welstein, a man of Swiss origin, returns to New York from East Africa in 1988 to find a society controlled by corrupt moneyed interests. After seeing thousands upon thousands killed in a worldwide revolt of the masses led by Caesar Lomellini (whose desire to destroy civilisation is perhaps accounted for by his not being of Anglo-Irish descent), in which gas was the weapon of choice, Welstein decides to fly back to his African home with a small group of friends. There, in Uganda, they hope to avoid the dangers of class struggle and to create a Utopian society centred around a town called . . . Stanley. Since Donnelly included no Africans in this Utopia, it is fair to say that these migrants carried with them their own American understanding of the frontier and the invisibility of indigenous people. It was only under such conditions, with the expansion of the European race around the world and the making invisible of indigenous peoples, that Utopian goals could be achieved and metropolitan corruption held at bay.⁸⁷

This involvement of populists in the 'frontier' imperial project is further revealed in the comparison with the Southern African frontier.⁸⁸ Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, for example, have described the Americans who occupied Oregon, eastern Texas, the 'arid lands of the Great Basin', and pastoral Mexican California as 'voortrekkers'. Superficially, they say,

the parallels to white occupation of the Orange Free State or the Transvaal are tantalizing, for in each of these regions the local Anglo-American population seized lands of both Indians and Spanish-Mexicans and practiced a doctrine of 'popular sovereignty' by establishing independent provinces or republics for a time. With the exception of the Mormons in Utah, however, these American trekkers were the cutting edge

of an aggressive American nationalism rather than a retreat from imperial or metropolitan authority.⁸⁹

Whether or not this last statement is exactly correct, given the extent to which American pioneers saw themselves as escaping from the clutches of the metropole and Afrikaners were participating in a form of aggressive nationalism with imperial links of their own, clearly the aggressive nationalism of the American 'voortrekkers' must have influenced the politics of the Populist movement.⁹⁰

Lamar and Thompson argue that the alliance of the Federal Government with American pioneers, so different from the opposition facing Afrikaners from their Imperial Government, made for a different political situation on the two frontiers.⁹¹ Moreover, as Christopher Saunders points out, Afrikaners faced a far larger African population than the Indian population facing American pioneers, and the Africans were to be used as a labour force while American Indians were pushed off to the distant reservation. In his chapter on the Great Trek, in *A History of South Africa to 1870*, Leonard Thompson notes that three main factors affected the course of the Great Trek: 'the qualities of the Voortrekkers as individuals and as a community; the environments into which they migrated; and the reactions of the British government and its local representatives'.⁹² Such factors were evident in all conditions of colonisation, from Fiji and New Zealand, eastward through Australia, India, Africa, the Caribbean, to the America Colonies. In the North American western 'frontier', these factors remained in place, the only change being that, for much of the region, the role of the British government had been usurped by the US government and its local representatives.

Once gender is inserted into the experiences and imagery of the two 'frontiers', as inevitably it must be, the differences between South Africa and the United States continue to fade. Anne McClintock has written of South Africa:

In the voluminous Afrikaner historiography, the history of the *volk* is organized around a male national narrative figured as an imperial journey into empty lands. The journey proceeds forwards in *geographical* space, but backwards in *racial* and *gender* time, to what is figured as a prehistoric zone of linguistic, racial and gender 'degeneration'. The myth of the 'empty land' is simultaneously the myth of 'virgin land' - effecting a double erasure. Within the colonial narrative, to be 'virgin' is to be empty of desire, voided of sexual agency, and passively awaiting the thrusting, male insemination of European military history, language and 'reason'. The feminizing of 'virgin' colonial lands also effects a territorial

appropriation, for if the land is virgin, Africans cannot claim aboriginal territorial rights, and the white male patrimony can be violently assured.⁹³

No wonder prostitutes would come to present such difficulties to nationalists! But more importantly, this passage could be transposed onto American colonial and imperial frontier without any difficulty whatsoever.

If any exceptionality arises from these 'frontier' comparisons, it clearly resides with the Afrikaners who, being of a different nationality from the government at the Cape, faced more significant opposition from their imperial power than was evident on other 'frontiers'. But this should not be overstated. Australian and New Zealand settlers often, for reasons of class, ethnicity, or presumed criminality, were restrained in their attempts to establish property rights. Moreover, the US government also entered into treaties with American Indian nations that, while usually discounted as not valid when it mattered, still needed to be confronted, and which sometimes placed them in positions of opposition to their settlers. With regard to the second of Thompson's factors, 'the environments into which they migrated', we must be careful not to exaggerate the degree to which the large African population made for a unique experience for Afrikaners. In the comparison with the United States this is portraying the 'frontier' in a single light. There were many different peoples with different political systems that presented a wide range of dilemmas for settlers. These tribes were capable of taking alternative political stances in relation to the federal government, eliciting a range of support among Europeans in the United States, and making alliances with other foreign powers which, in many cases, presented opposition as intractable to settlers as those met on the South African veld. Suffice it to say, if one examines the conditions in Texas and those in Minnesota, the stories are very different.

Finally, the idea that Africans would become the labour force for Afrikaners finds many parallels in the United States, where the migration of southern plantation capitalists to the southwestern states was made possible by their use of non-European slave labour, where the importance of labour importation would be seen as of paramount importance for development and labour control (internal slave trade, Chinese indentured labour), where such importation would lead to similar exclusion acts and racial job bars pushed for by white working classes, where the creation of reservations would be seen as appropriate, and where wars would be fought to determine which Europeans had authority over the territories.⁹⁴ Differences exist that make each situation unique, and each nation's 'frontier' a site of many ideologies and experiences. What we need to know, then, is not how different frontier movements differ, but how certain ideologies and experiences get privileged in the process of creating national narra-

tives. In this instance we need to examine, not who the populists were (there were many strands to rural protest), but how it is that aspects of their disparate ideologies have been accentuated and others elided to produce one kind of movement, while the disparate elements of Southern African frontier movements have been given a different reading.

Actual or perceived differences in 'frontier' experiences may not be as important as the differences in the way historians and others have written about the ideologies that emerged from them. For example, American Populists have been valorised and the pioneer spirit has been seen as the backbone of their movement, while the same features found in Afrikaner nationalism have been vilified as products of their backwardness. While Populists can continue to be romanticised (through the invisibility of American Indians), only supporters of apartheid have done the same for the Voortrekkers, and the likelihood that this will continue uncontested even in Afrikaans-language South African historiography is slim. This difference is enshrined in Stanley's description of his massacre of Bumbireh Africans. Perhaps influenced by his reporting of fights against American Indians, Stanley revealed a certain relish at the massacre, and was shocked when his reports led to a great uproar at the British Foreign Office and the Royal Geographic Society.⁹⁵ The literary conventions that led to protest against such actions in Africa and acceptance of them on the American 'frontier' have been carried over into the historiography.

The comparison with the Southern African 'frontier' allows us to see the similarity between mid-Western Populists' predicament and those of Voortrekkers in Southern Africa. Although Afrikaners opposed the British imperial control, whether from Whitehall or Cape Town, they did not reject imperialism altogether; they shared many traditions that arose out from their Christianity, European background, and, with the opening up of diamond and gold mines, from a shared sense that the good society would be achieved by extracting minerals from the ground for themselves and not for the benefit of Africans. Theirs was a settler imperialism, that believed that more of the benefits of imperialism should accrue for those on the frontier, while those in the metropolitan centres should benefit less. The establishment of a government in the Transvaal, before and after the British occupation of 1877-80, gave concrete form to such aspirations. Many American populists would have endorsed similar beliefs. In their minds, it was they who 'won' the west; it was they who were carrying the benefits of western civilisation to the farthest corners of the North American continent. It should be they who benefited also. The *Spectator* of 1893, for example, observed: 'Almost everywhere, certainly in England, France, Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, and the United States, the agriculturalists, formerly so conservative, are becoming fiercely discontented, declare

they gain less by civilization than the rest of the community, and are looking for remedies of a drastic nature.⁹⁶ Clearly, the definition of 'civilisation' had an imperial dimension, and in areas of expansion like Southern Africa and the American agrarian belt, would give rise to a particular kind of politics that opposed domination by the metropolitan centre.

Recognising the mid-Western Populists' location in the imperial middle is crucial to understanding their ideology. To suggest, as James Turner does, that they were isolated and confused, is implicitly to accept that the land which they had occupied really was 'free' and uncontested. Knowing that these people were linked to the militant expansion of American nationalism into the frontier regions and, to borrow from Takaki and Whitman, 'the masculine thrust towards Asia', provides us with an alternative source for their 'tendency to rely on scapegoats and panaceas'.⁹⁷ Rather than this tendency being the product of a 'sense of confusion' among farmers, it could have been the product of years of experience dividing the world into the forces of good (white Americans and civilisation) and evil (Indians) – essential if one was to participate in what Melville called 'the metaphysics of Indian hating'.⁹⁸ Incorporating eastern capitalists and Jews into this Manichean model was relatively easy, as William Jennings Bryan showed in his 1896 Cross of Gold Speech.

Clearly, important differences existed between frontier-informed Afrikaner nationalism and frontier-informed American Populism – the degree to which Afrikaner nationalism was shaped by the Dutch Reform Church, for one thing. Moreover, Populists never took up arms against eastern industrialists as Afrikaners were to do against the British in the Anglo-Boer Wars. But such events, crucial as they may be, should not blind us to the similarities between the two. The manner in which Populism dissipated after 1896, when President McKinley turned 'the metaphysics of Indian hating' into a national obsession, only to be reborn in the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, highlights this imperial aspect. Further, while the terms within which Afrikaners and Populists would be incorporated into their respective republics would differ, such incorporation would eventually take place.⁹⁹

CONCLUSION

Indians are not historians; and they rarely show any critical ability. Even their most useful books, books full of research and information, exasperate with their repetitions and diffuseness, and lose effect by their uncritical enthusiasms. Such solid highways to scholarly esteem and approval as indexes and bibliographies are almost unknown to them.

Edward Thompson, *The Other Side of the Medal* (1926)

Exceptionalism is, in many respects, an imperial formulation. Those who have come to see themselves as exceptions to the rules of history, the British and Americans for example, have done so when their nations reached a position of world domination and when their interpretations of history (found in Whiggish and Progressive history, Orientalism and modernisation theory, to name a few) could prevail over others. More importantly, the idea of exceptionalism depends on a description of the nation that is defined by certain parameters and narratives that, however flexible and expansive, simultaneously elide or exclude others. This is an imposition on the historical record, the privileging of some over others, the accentuation of the peculiar, and the downplaying of similarities with other nations or peoples that are described in such a way so as to make them seem unexceptional or ordinary.

The kinds of narratives hinted at here – those formed around intersections with other societies and nation states, or based on the experiences of people who are generally deemed marginal (in other words, those people upon whom even social historians have had a difficulty conferring agency) – appear to contradict exceptionalist theories. Of course we will wish to impose order on the myriad narratives thrown up, we all strive towards synthesis. But as we perform this 'profoundly "worldly" activity' – creating worlds of 'first' and 'third' varieties, establishing nations of this and that kind – we do so in the political realm, shaped by our own imperial location and our own desire to protect a world that might be lost.¹⁰⁰

Once this is recognised it becomes apparent that widespread acceptance of the exceptionalism of the United States depended to some degree on the fact that it had 'exceptional' historians: historians whose claims to 'objectivity' were never systematically dismissed as tainted on the basis of their social/imperial location, and who had the luxury to consider all other nations' historians so tainted. Like Henry Morton Stanley on Lake Victoria, Americanists were able to 'pick off the natives' while staying out of the range of any returning missiles. They could also choose those people with whom they would share their canoes.

NOTES

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1. Breyten Breytenbach, 'Dog's Bone', *New York Review of Books*, 26 May 1995, 4-5.
2. Stanley Greenberg, *Race and State in Capitalist Development: Comparative Perspectives* (New Haven, 1981), as the title suggests, analyses the role of the state in South African society. The main focus, however, is on the role of different social groups - mining and commercial capitalists, large farmers, and white labourers - in the creation of the apartheid state. It may be difficult to infer from this analysis how these different groups will act once apartheid is eradicated in a state that is perhaps even more centralised than before. See Michael Burawoy, 'State and Social Revolution in South Africa: Reflections on the Comparative Perspectives of Greenberg and Skocpol', *Kapitalstate*, 9 (1981), 93-122. Marxist historians, meanwhile, have argued that race has been manipulated primarily by capitalists who have retained their control over the state, and that race and class relations have merged. As such, they have used class analysis to understand the extreme racial divisions in South Africa. Whether or not their instrumentalist interpretation of the state is correct is beyond the scope of this paper, but questions remain about how different social groups have acted in the downfall of apartheid, whether these suggest different roles than were described by Marxist revisionists in the past, and so on. For Marxist revisionists, see (among others) H.J. and R.E. Simons, *Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950* (Harmondsworth, 1969); Martin Legassick, 'South Africa: Capital Accumulation and Violence', *Economy and Society*, 3 (1974), 255-80; Frederick Johnstone, *Class, Race, and Gold: A Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa* (London, 1976); Duncan Innes, *Anglo American and the Rise of Modern South Africa* (New York, 1984); and Robert H. Davies, 'Mining Capital, the State and Unskilled White Workers in South Africa, 1901-1913', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 3 (1976), 41-69; and *Capital, State and White Labour in South Africa, 1900-1960* (Brighton, 1977). See also B.S. Kantor and H.F. Kenny, 'The Poverty of Neo-Marxism: the case of South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 3 (1976), 20-40, and Harold Wolpe's response: 'A Comment on "The Poverty of Neo-Marxism"', *Journal of Southern African Studies* (1977), 240-56.
3. See Chris Lowe, 'Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the Problem of Ethnic Nationalism in South Africa', in Joshua Brown *et al.*, *History from South Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices* (Philadelphia, 1991), 195-208.
4. See Colin Bundy, 'An Image of Its Own Past? Towards a Comparison of American and South African Historiography', *Radical History Review*, 46/7 (1990) for a discussion of historiographical shifts in both the United States and South Africa, as well as some discussion of future developments among radical historians of South Africa. National boundaries are not questioned

- in this article in the ways proposed here. *Ibid.*, 82-104. For shifts in the historiography of Reconstruction in America, see Bernard Weisberger, 'The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography', *Journal of Southern History*, 25 (1959), 427-47.
5. William Finnegan, 'The Election Mandela Lost', *New York Review of Books*, 20 October 1994, 33-34.
 6. *Ibid.*, 33.
 7. Hermann Giliomee and Jannie Gagiano, eds, *The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel and Northern Ireland* (Cape Town, 1990); Donald Harman Akinson, *God's People: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel and Ulster* (Ithaca, 1992). See also George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa* (New York, 1985), 319.
 8. Giliomee stands at the forefront of such reinterpretation. See, for example, "'Survival in Justice': An Afrikaner Debate over Apartheid", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 36:3 (July 1994), 527-48; and 'Democratization in South Africa', *Political Science Quarterly*, 110:1 (1995), 83-104. Unlike other authors, however, Giliomee is pessimistic about the potential for the emergence of a liberal democracy in South Africa. More optimistic authors are: F. van Zyl Slabbert, *The Quest for Democracy: South Africa in Transition* (Johannesburg, 1992); Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, *The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South Africa* (Berkeley, 1993).
 9. Michael B. Katz, *The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare* (New York, 1989); Katz, ed., *The "Underclass" Debate: Views from History* (Princeton, 1993), 3-23; Linda Gordon, *Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare* (New York, 1994). Nicholas Lemann's widely acclaimed *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America* (New York, 1991) revives the Frazier-Elkins-Moynihan thesis about the weak black family through his sharecropper thesis.
 10. Alan Brinkley, 'For Their Own Good', *New York Review of Books* (26 May 1994), 43.
 11. Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975), esp. 381-87.
 12. Rob Gregg, 'The More Things Change . . .', *Chartist* (November-December 1992).
 13. *In City of Quartz: Excavating the City of the Future in Los Angeles* (London, 1990), Mike Davis clearly shows at a structural level why it is that we should not be surprised by events that are occurring in Los Angeles, and how these are making their impact felt on California first, and the nation later.
 14. The main book-length comparative studies of the United States and South Africa are: John W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (New York, 1982); George M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History* (New York, 1981); Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, eds, *The Frontier in History: North America and Southern Africa Compared* (New Haven, 1981); and Stanley Greenberg, *Race*

- and State in Capitalist Development. Debates between Edna Bonacich and Michael Burawoy over divided and split labour markets, while not explicitly comparative, extend to both countries and have comparative implications: Burawoy, 'The Capitalist State in South Africa: Marxist and Sociological Perspectives on Race and Class', *Political Power and Social Theory*, 2 (1981); Bonacich, 'Capitalism and Race in South Africa: A Split Market View', *ibid.* Similarly, William Julius Wilson's *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions* (Chicago, 1978), is implicitly comparative, founded in large measure on Pierre van den Berghe's typology in *Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective* (New York, 1967).
15. George Fredrickson, for example, argues that the differences between Jim Crow in the South and 'native segregation' in South Africa 'are of such a degree as to cast doubt on the value of a detailed comparison of the unequal treatment of southern blacks during the Jim Crow era and the lot of Africans under segregation or apartheid since 1910'. *White Supremacy*, 241. Fredrickson nevertheless proceeds to make just such a 'detailed comparison' and finds differences between the two systems of segregation are 'too great, in terms of both underlying structures and patterns of historical development, to sustain comparison based on analogy'. *Ibid.* 250. While John Cell was able to build a book on this analogy, it is true that he too found substantial differences between the two countries' systems.
 16. Ian Tyrell, 'American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History', *American Historical Review*, 96:4 (October 1991), 1031-55.
 17. Where the nation state is not compared, a particular segment of the nation is taken as a proxy for the whole, or as a means to understand a national phenomenon. Thus, John Cell compares South Africa to the American South, and is critical of Stanley Greenberg for choosing to compare Alabama to South Africa: *The Highest Stage*, xii-xiii. In fact, this criticism highlights the nationalist bent, as taking Alabama (part of the American system) as a comparative focus for South Africa (part of the British imperial system) is justified on many levels. The assumption that there is just one system of segregation in the South and so also the United States may be invalid.
 18. Tyrell, 'American Exceptionalism', 1035-36. Greg Cuthbertson, 'Racial Attraction: Tracing the Historiographical Alliances between South Africa and the United States', *Journal of American History*, 81:3 (December 1994), 1132. Fredrickson, 'Comparative History', in Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us* (Ithaca, 1986). Fredrickson attempts to move beyond this national focus in *The Arrogance of Race: Historical Perspectives on Slavery, Racism, and Social Inequality* (Middletown, 1988), but his Weberian typology of different societies, fulfils the same goal. Peter Kolchin, in 'Comparing American History', in Kutler and Katz, eds, *The Promise of American History* (Baltimore, 1982), 65, asserts that 'most historical judgments are implicitly comparative' and that 'comparative history constitutes the effort to do explicitly what most historians do most of the time'. He does not, however, question the national orientation of most historical judgements and his own comparative work, *Unfree Labor: American Slavery and Russian Serfdom* (Cambridge MA, 1987) fits this model; see also, 'Reevaluating the Antebellum Slave Community: A Comparative Perspective', *Journal of*

- American History*, 70:3 (Dec. 1983). Other works on slavery typical of this focus are: Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1946); Stanley M. Elkins, *Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life* (Chicago, 1959); Herbert S. Klein, *Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba* (New York, 1967); Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (New York, 1971); Richard R. Beeman, 'Labor Forces and Race Relations: A Comparative View of the Colonization of Brazil and Virginia', *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXVI:4 (Dec. 1971); and Richard S. Dunn, 'A Tale of Two Plantations: Slave Life at Mesopotamia in Jamaica and Mount Airy in Virginia, 1799 to 1828', *William and Mary Quarterly*, XXXIV (January 1977). Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-30, and Britain, 1948-68* (New York, 1973) reaches for national conclusions about race when a study of New York City and London might have different imperial stories to tell. In *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (Chicago, 1981), he shows his affinity for the idea of American exceptionalism. Comparing the American city to the European he neglects to consider the possibility that while London, Paris and Stockholm may look different from New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, other cities like Bombay, Johannesburg and Manila may be structured very similarly to them. Eric Foner, in *Nothing But Freedom* (Baton Rouge, 1983), 2-3, endeavours to use comparative analysis 'to move beyond "American exceptionalism" to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the problem of emancipation and its aftermath'. And yet he arrives at a conclusion that 'sympathetic local and state governments during Reconstruction afforded American freedmen a form of political and economic leverage unmatched by their counterparts in other societies'. Generalising from South Carolinian experiences, and informed by the movement towards a 'Second Reconstruction', Foner's comparative study, too, falls foul of the nationalist tendency.
19. An interesting exception to this rule is the institution of slavery itself, which had to be considered 'peculiar' in order for it to be comfortably incorporated into the notion of 'American'. For further discussion of the intersectedness of histories, see Gyan Prakash, 'Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism', *American Historical Review*, 99:5 (December 1994), 1486. Sport which has been tied to colonialism and imperialism, and which has transnational histories has received insufficient attention from comparativists. For a compelling exception to this rule, see Ian Tyrell, 'The Emergence of Modern American Baseball c.1850-80', in Richard Cashman and Michael McKernan, eds, *Sport in History* (Queensland, 1979).
 20. David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (London, 1991), 65-92. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds, *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (Princeton, 1986), makes no mention of slavery, abolitionism or empires generally.
 21. E.P. Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English', in *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (New York, 1978), 245-301. In *Towards the Abolition of Whiteness* (London, 1994), 27-33, David Roediger argues (contra Sean

- Wilentz) that the existence of slavery and the prominence of race in the United States makes American labour exceptional when compared to European societies. Wilentz, 'Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement', *International Labor and Working Class History*, 26 (1984), 1-36.
22. Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988). See also, Gregg, 'Group Portrait with Lady', *Reviews in American History*, 20 (1992).
 23. C.A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830* (New York, 1989). For attempts to theorise empire in American studies, see William Appelman Williams, *Empire as a Way of Life* (New York, 1980); Amy Kaplan, 'Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture', in Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, eds, *Cultures of US Imperialism* (Durham, 1993).
 24. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, 15. This important conceptualisation for British history has been further developed by Linda Colley in *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven, 1992). See also, Antoinette Burton, 'Rules of Thumb: British History and "Imperial Culture" in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain', *Women's History Review*, 3:4 (1994); and Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley, 1975). While being careful to see the imperial considerations in the political incorporation of Scotland, Ireland and Wales, we need also to be aware of the ways in which others besides Anglo-Saxons and Celts were incorporated into the imperial model. Moreover it is important to be aware that just because empire is significant this does not mean that *only* the history of the metropole is important, while histories of the peripheries should remain just that. This is an assumption that has been present to some extent in Eric Hobsbawm's work. As Tony Judt notes in his review of *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991*, Eric Hobsbawm is 'unashamedly Eurocentric'. Building on this unashamedly eurocentric foundation, Judt notes: 'Any history of the world in our century is of necessity a history in large measure of the things Europeans (and North Americans) did to themselves and to others, and of how non-Europeans reacted to them and were (usually adversely) affected. That, after all, is what is wrong with the twentieth century, seen from a "third world" perspective, and to criticize Hobsbawm, as some reviewers have done, for understanding this and writing accordingly, seems to me incoherent.' 'Downhill all the Way', *The New York Review of Books* (25 May 1995), 21. Understanding that an imperial meridian exists should lead towards 'coherence' founded on the realisation that what non-Europeans did was in fact as important as, and in some cases more important than the actions of Europeans. An imperial perspective allows one to see how the actions of a Toussaint L'Ouverture in Saint Domingue could have an impact from Savannah to Moscow, a John Chilembwe in Nyasaland could affect people from South Africa to Edinburgh. The agency of all - white working classes, white elites, and non-Europeans alike - was limited by the imperial terrain, but that terrain was shaped by all, sometimes with minimal regard to the power relations within it. See Ranajit Guha, 'Dominance without Hegemony and its Historiography', in Guha, ed., *Subaltern Studies VI* (Delhi, 1992), in which he critiques the

- 'Cambridge approach' to South Asian history for 'writing up Indian history as a "portion of the British History"', 305. For the significance of Toussaint on Jefferson and Napoleon, see Michael Zuckerman, *Almost Chosen People: Oblique Biographies in the American Grain* (Berkeley, 1993).
25. Colley, *Britons*, 120-32.
 26. Judith R. Walkowitz, for example, tells of the almost orientalist vision of East London when compared to West London; *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago, 1992), 19, 193. See also Ruth H. Lindborg, 'The "Asiatic" and the Boundaries of Victorian Englishness', *Victorian Studies* (Spring 1994); Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993); Moira Ferguson, *Subject to Others: British Women Writers and Colonial Slavery, 1670-1834* (New York, 1992).
 27. See Henry Jones Ford, *The Scotch-Irish in America* (Princeton, 1915).
 28. Kaplan and Pease, eds, *Cultures of US Imperialism*.
 29. Cell, *The Highest Stage*; Fredrickson, *White Supremacy*.
 30. This number is used by Salman Rushdie in both *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism, 1981-1991* (London, 1991) and *The Satanic Verses* (New York, 1988). It also appears in the movie *Masala* (Canada, 1993), by director Srinivas Krishna.
 31. Rob Nixon, *Homelands, Harlem and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World Beyond* (New York, 1994), 1, 5. Another attempt to make transnational linkages can be found in George M. Fredrickson, 'Resistance to White Supremacy: Nonviolence in the US South and South Africa', *Dissent* (Winter 1995), 61-70, which draws on the Gandhian influences in both American and South African resistance. The reliance on a national comparison is evident, and this leads to the rather predictable comparison being made between South African political violence and black-on-black violence in the United States. Since this comparison ends in the claim that 'in the short run, the need for more and better policing has become evident to many blacks' this national bias must certainly be considered a shortcoming; Fredrickson, 'Resistance', 70.
 32. Ian Tyrell suggests other kinds of connections that can be made in, what he terms, 'transnational history', through regional analysis, environmental history, and the study of organisations, movements and ideologies; 'American Exceptionalism', 1038-53.
 33. Mtesa, the Kabuka of Buganda, made the initial appeal for missionaries, which Stanley reported in November 1875. He added, according to Thomas Pakenham, that 'here was the most promising field for a mission in all the pagan world'; *The Scramble for Africa* (New York, 1991), 28.
 34. Cell, *The Highest Stage*, 33-45. For an excellent book-length study of African Methodists in South Africa, see James T. Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (New York, 1995).
 35. For Turner's attitudes towards the freedpeople, see Leon Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery* (New York, 1980), 458; for Coppin's views of Southerners, see Robert Gregg, *Sparks from the Anvil of Oppression: Philadelphia's African Methodists and Southern Migrants, 1890-1940* (Philadelphia, 1993), 94-95, 196; see also, Levi J. Coppin, *Observations of Persons and Things in South Africa, 1900-1904* (Philadelphia, 1905);

- and, Adelaide Cromwell Hill and Martin Kilson, eds, *Apropos of Africa: Sentiments of Negro American Leaders on Africa from the 1800s to the 1950s* (London, 1969), 44–47.
36. Gregg, *Sparks*, 69–86; Cell, *The Highest Stage*, 41.
 37. George Shepperson and Thomas Price, *Independent African: John Chilembwe and the Origins, Setting and Significance of the Nyasaland Native Rising of 1915* (Edinburgh, 1958).
 38. Brian Wilan, *Sol Plaatje: South African Nationalist, 1876–1932* (Berkeley, 1984), 259–81. For additional connections between African-Americans and Africans, see Robin D.G. Kelley, 'Introduction' in C.L.R. James, *A History of Pan-African Revolt* (Chicago, 1995), 1–33.
 39. Tim Couzens, "'Moralizing Leisure Time': The Transatlantic Connection and Black Johannesburg, 1918–1936", in Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds, *Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture and Consciousness, 1870–1930* (Harlow, 1982).
 40. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York, 1992), 5, 21. Gregg, 'Beyond Boundaries, Beyond the Whale', *American Quarterly*, 45:4 (December 1993), 631–38.
 41. Dennis C. Dickerson, *The Land of the Southern Cross: John A. Gregg and South Africa* (New Orleans, 1990); Levi J. Coppin, *Unwritten History* (New York, 1968); Robert R. Wright, Jr, *Eighty-Seven Years Behind the Black Curtain* (Philadelphia, 1968); William Henry Heard, *From Slavery to the Bishopric* (Philadelphia, 1924); Hollis R. Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot* (New York, 1967); Wilson J. Moses, *Alexander Crummell: A Study of Civilization and Discontent* (New York, 1989) 179–95; Appiah, *In My Father's House*, 10–23 (Crummell) and 28–46 (Du Bois).
 42. Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (London, 1993), 1–40. See Madhavi Kale, Review of *Black Atlantic*, in *Social History* (forthcoming).
 43. Gilroy, *Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black Cultures* (London, 1993); Gregg, *Sparks*; James R. Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration* (Chicago, 1989). For an example of assumptions about division within the African diaspora, see Clarence E. Walker's unfounded assertion that Americans could not have supported Marcus Garvey in the numbers some have claimed simply because he was Jamaican. *Deromanticizing Black History: Critical Essays and Reappraisals* (Knoxville, 1991), 34–55.
 44. Manning Clark, *A Short History of Australia* (Victoria, 1986), 105–13.
 45. Charles van Onselen, *Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwatersrand, 1886–1914*, vol. 1, *New Babylon* (Harlow, 1982), 108.
 46. For one compelling example of Americans in South Africa and prospecting migrants, see Mary and Richard Bradford, eds, *An American Family on the African Frontier* (Colorado, 1993).
 47. C.W. De Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa* (Oxford, 1978). James Campbell notes that more than half the mines on the Witwatersrand were managed by Americans ('one frustrated Rhodesian mining engineer complained that it was impossible to get a job without an American accent'); *Songs of Zion*, 126–7. Moreover, these transients did not merely stick to mining. Once the Australian gold rush ended, Pacific islands like Fiji were inundated with speculators looking for more gold and mineral deposits. When their efforts

- to locate such deposits failed, and other opportunities appeared, they turned to a wide range of capitalist endeavours. The emergence of the sugar plantation system in Fiji, for example, which drew on the Indian indentured labour (a system established in the British Caribbean after emancipation), was just one such development. No doubt others played important roles in the coming of sugar and Chinese indentured labourers to Hawaii. I am indebted to John D. Kelly for this information.
48. De Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa*, 166; Innes, *Anglo-American*, 47.
 49. The antecedents to such labour practices were not, as might be expected, the wage labouring systems of North America, but rather the indentured labour systems developed by Anglo-American capitalists in the years after the end of slavery. For an explanation of the process by which this occurred, see Madhavi Kale, *Casting Labor: Empire and Indentured Labor Migration from India to the British Caribbean* (forthcoming); 'Projecting Identities: Empire and Indentured Labor Migration from India to Trinidad and British Guiana, 1836–1885', in Peter van der Veer, ed., *Nation and Migration: The Politics of Space in the South Asian Diaspora* (Philadelphia, 1995), 73–92; 'Opening Salvo: Making a Colonial Labor Shortage in Post-Abolition British Guiana and Trinidad, 1834–45', unpublished paper presented to the Eleventh International Economic History Congress, Milan, September 1994; and 'Casting Labor in the Imperial Mold: Indian Indentured Migration to the British Caribbean, 1837–45', unpublished paper presented to the International Conference on Challenge and Change: The Indian Diaspora in its Historical and Contemporary Contexts, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad, August 1995.
 50. For a full description of the methods used to deprive the Chinese of access to gold mines and then exclude them from the United States, see Connie Young Yu, 'The Chinese in American Courts', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 4:3 (1972); and Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California* (Berkeley, 1971). De Kiewiet, *A History of South Africa*, 166. There was also, in South Africa, an exclusion of Chinese indentured labourers ('celestials') in 1906; Philip Snow, *The Star Raft: China's Encounter with Africa* (New York, 1988), 47–53.
 51. Van Onselen, *New Babylon*, 110.
 52. *Ibid.*, 111. In 1898, *The Standard and Diggers' News* had complained: 'There is a large and thriving colony of Americanised Russian women engaged in the immoral traffic, who are controlled by an association of macquereaus of pronounced Russian pedigree embellished by a twangy flashy embroidery of style and speech acquired in the Bowery of NYC, where most of them, with frequent excursions to London, have graduated in the noble profession.'
 53. George J. Kneeland, *Commercialized Prostitution in New York City* (Montclair, NJ, 1969), 336.
 54. In 1896, there were 25 282 white males and 14 172 white females living in Johannesburg, a ratio of 1.78 men to every woman. For blacks the ratio was even more skewed, with about ten men for every one woman in the city, and in the nearby work compounds, a ratio of about twenty-four to one; van Onselen, *New Babylon*, 104; Kale, 'Casting Labor'.
 55. Van Onselen 107.

56. *Ibid.*, 108.
57. White, quoted in Philippa Levine, 'Rough Usage: Prostitution, Law and the Social Historian', in Adrian Wilson, ed., *Rethinking Social History: English Society 1570-1920 and its Interpretation* (Manchester, 1993), 276.
58. Ruth Rosen, *Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900-1918* (Baltimore, 1982).
59. The 'French Madam', Matilda Hermann, for example, paid about \$5000 each year to the police. W.T. Stead, *Satan's Invisible World Displayed* (New York, 1974, orig. pub. 1898), 127.
60. Levine, 'Rough Usage', 276. Levine writes: 'As we develop a better understanding of the complex relationship between state, law and work, a case may emerge for seeing large-scale prostitution (and its concomitant, a more attentive state) as the feminised auxiliary service industry to changing male work patterns, perhaps most particularly in "frontier" contexts such as the opening of the American West, the Europeanising of South Africa or the development of Australia.' The similarities between mining and prostitution labour markets was reinforced by the fact that when mining capitalists went to India, China and Japan to secure labour, members of the 'pimping fraternity' (so-called by Joe Silver) often shadowed them in pursuit of prostitutes. Van Onselen, *New Babylon*, 138.
61. Van Onselen, *New Babylon*, 121. The Bowery Boys' methods in New York and the London East End, as described by their detractors at least, are described in full here. Van Onselen perhaps reads these sources uncritically and he conforms to a prostitution discourse which distances it from other labour, employing images from slavery that Progressives of the era also employed. Having seen capital move people and production from one region or country to others so readily in the last few decades this assumption of difference between slaves and prostitutes on the one hand, and free labourers on the other seems more tenuous.
62. Other terms used by women were housekeeper, milliner, musician and florist. Van Onselen, *New Babylon*, 119-23. Philippa Levine, 'Women and Prostitution: Metaphor, Reality, History', *Canadian Journal of History*, XXVIII (December 1993), 484. Veena Talwar Oldenburg, 'Lifestyle as Resistance: The Case of the Courtesans of Lucknow', in Douglas Haynes and Gyan Prakash, eds, *Contesting Power: Resistance and Everyday Social Relations in South Asia* (Delhi, 1991), 23-61.
63. Judith R. Walkowitz, *Prostitution and Victorian Society: Women, Class and the State* (New York, 1980); and, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago, 1992), 21-22. Levine, 'Women and Prostitution', 482; 'Rough Usage', 266-92; and 'Consistent Contradictions: Prostitution and Protective Labour Legislation in Nineteenth-century England', *Social History*, 19 (January 1994), 17-35.
64. See, for example, the experiences of Chinese and Japanese prostitutes described by Lucie Cheng, 'Free, Indentured, Enslaved: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-century America', in Cheng and Edna Bonacich, eds, *Labor Immigration under Capitalism: Asian Workers in the US before World War II* (Berkeley, 1984); Yuji Ichioka, 'Ameyuki-san: Japanese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America', *Amerasia*, 4:1 (1977) 1-21, and *The Issei* (New York, 1988).

65. Levine, 'Women and Prostitution', 488; Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight*.
66. Robin D.G. Kelley, 'We are Not What We Seem', *Journal of American History*, 80:1 (June 1993), 75-112; and 'An Archaeology of Resistance', *American Quarterly*, 44 (June 1992), 292-98. For a critique of Scott's work along these lines, see Haynes and Prakash, 'Introduction: The Entanglement of Power and Resistance', in *Contesting Power*, 2-4, 9-11; and Timothy Mitchell, 'Everyday Metaphors of Power', *Theory and Society*, 19 (1990).
67. Lynn Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora* (Boston, 1990), 123; Tomas Almaguer, *Racial Fault Lines: The Historical Origins of White Supremacy in California* (Berkeley, 1994), 174-78.
68. Here note Darlene Clark Hine's critique of Roger Lane's estimates of prostitutes in Philadelphia's African-American population at the turn of the twentieth century. Mine is right to suggest that Lane's estimates are faulty and exaggerate the number of prostitutes. Lane argued that lower birthrates among African-Americans could be accounted for by the infertility caused by diseases associated with prostitution, and he suggested that as many as 25 per cent of all black women in the city had engaged in the 'trade'. Clark Hine prefers to see such lower birthrates arising from black women's sexual abstinence (in fact, the imbalanced sex ratios and the nature of domestic work were sufficient causes). Lane, *Roots of Violence in Black Philadelphia, 1860-1900* (Cambridge, 1986), 130-35, 158-59; Hine, 'Black Migration to the Urban Midwest: The Gender Dimension, 1915-45', in Joe William Trotter, Jr, ed., *The Great Migration in Historical Perspective* (Bloomington, 1991), 134-35. What is at stake for Clark Hine is the portrayal of women in the black community and whether or not historians can move beyond 'latent acceptance of the myths concerning the alleged unbridled passions and animalistic sexuality of black women'. And yet, if prostitution is such a common factor in all migrations, it need not tell us anything about passions and sexuality. In fact, both sides of the argument fall within Levine's category of 'rough usage' of prostitutes, failing to rise above the 'homogenous notions of prostitution as a category' and the moralistic arguments about prostitutes propagated by Progressive reformers and nationalists at the time; Levine, 'Rough Usage', 286.
69. Kale, 'Projecting Identities', 80-83.
70. Du Bois in Paula Giddings, *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (New York, 1984), 61. See also, Dan Czitrom, 'Underworlds and Underdogs: Big Tim Sullivan and Metropolitan Politics in New York, 1889-1913', *Journal of American History*, 78:3 (1991), 548; and Irving Howe, *World of Our Fathers: The Journey of the East European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made* (New York, 1976), 96-98. Howe devotes only two pages to prostitution, and claims that, along with crime, 'it was never at the center of Jewish immigrant life', 101. This claim perhaps shows the success Jewish leaders had struggling to disassociate their ethnic group from the taint of 'crime'. Defining 'the center' of immigrant life is problematic and is generally undertaken only when it is deemed important to push to the imagined periphery of one's own group behaviour considered common to other people.
71. Lisa Lowe, 'Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, 1 (Spring

- 1991). Evelyn Nakano Glenn, in *Issei, Nisei, War Bride: Three Generations of Japanese American Women in Domestic Service* (Philadelphia, 1986), 114, makes no mention of prostitution, and yet the manner in which many Japanese-American men resisted women's efforts to join the paid labour force (even under the direst economic conditions) provide examples of how men felt the behaviour of their spouses reflected badly on them and Japanese-Americans as a whole.
72. Anne McClintock, 'Family Feuds', 61.
 73. Kale, 'Casting Labor in the Imperial Mold'. The other side of this nationalism coin, of course, is the anxiety whites in the United States and British Empire had that 'their women' might have been 'violated' by blacks and Indians respectively. Thus, any lynching and all the horrors perpetrated by the British in 1857 could be justified by claims (most often spurious) that white women had been in some way dishonoured. See Edward Thompson, *The Other Side of the Medal* (London, 1926), 38; and Gregg and Kale, 'The Empire and Mr. Thompson: The Making of Indian Princes and the English Working Class' (forthcoming).
 74. Japanese nationalists and government officials, however, were far more successful in controlling access to prostitutes in America than were the Chinese. Cheng, 'Free, Indentured, Enslaved'; Ichioka, 'Ameyuki-Sen', 16-17. In Bombay in 1911, the Turkish Consul, upset by the association between prostitution and 'Arabs', persuaded the Government of India to repatriate one brothel-keeper and many women to Baghdad. It is unknown whether the Japanese intervened on behalf of the many Japanese prostitutes: S.M. Edwardes, *Crime in India* (London, 1924), 87.
 75. Pan, *Sons of the Yellow Emperor*, 123.
 76. Oldenburg, 'Lifestyle as Resistance', 55.
 77. This is based on a cursory study of several texts and syllabi. The texts include: Joseph R. Conlin, *The American Past: A Survey of American History* (New York, 1993); George Brown Tindall, *America: A Narrative History* (New York, 1988); James A. Henretta et al., *America's History* (New York, 1993); John M. Blum et al., *The National Experience: A History of the United States* (New York, 1993); Morison et al., *A Concise History of the American Republic* (New York, 1977); and John A. Garraty, *The American Nation: A History of the United States* (New York, 1979). Nell Painter's, *Standing at Armageddon: The United States, 1877-1919* (New York, 1987) devotes one page to American Indians, though this is not included in an analysis of westward expansion but in a chapter on 'The White Man's Burden - Imperialism'. Even Alan Trachtenberg's *Incorporation of America* uses this layout, though for Trachtenberg the dichotomy established on the frontier between 'civilization' and 'savage' becomes central to the meaning of 'America' itself; 25-37.
 78. Unless there is a brief mention of the American Indian Movement as an outgrowth of the Civil Rights movement in sections on the 1960s and 1970s.
 79. This discussion focuses largely on mid-Western Populism. The analysis could be extended, with modifications, to Southern Populism.
 80. John D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (Minneapolis, 1931); Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955); James Turner, 'Understanding the Populists', *Journal of American History*, 67:2 (1980), 354-73; Lawrence Goodwyn, *The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in*

- America* (New York, 1978); Norman Pollack, *The Populist Response to Industrial America* (Cambridge, 1976); and, Robert C. McMath, Jr., *American Populism: A Social History* (New York, 1993).
81. This ignoring of the significance of American Indians is shared by other historians focusing on this period. In *Exodusters: Black Migration to Kansas after Reconstruction* (New York, 1976), 113, for example, Nell Painter mentions that the migrants were to relocate to former Cherokee land in Kansas. The significance of this is not commented upon. One of the latest overviews of populism, McMath's *American Populism*, even goes so far as to describe 'Populist Country Before Populism'. This background chapter makes no mention of the fact that Indians were either present or recently removed from this country.
 82. Throughout the period of the populist movement Indians saw their territory reduced from 138 million to 78 million acres. Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 163. Moreover, this was a period of the commercialisation of the romanticised Wild West, both in dime novels and in Wild West shows. Trachtenberg, *Incorporation of America*, 22-25, and Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic* (New York, 1990), 321-47.
 83. This is not merely a condition for the mid-western and western states. Ward Churchill writes: 'No area within what are now the 48 contiguous states of the United States is exempt from having produced its own historical variant of the Sand Creek phenomenon. The very existence of the United States in its modern territorial and demographic configuration is contingent upon this fact. Racially-oriented invasion, conquest, genocide and subsequent denial are integral, constantly recurring and thus defining features of the Euroamerican make-up from the instant the first boatload of self-ordained colonists set foot in the New World.' *Fantasies of the Master Race: Literature, Cinema and the Colonization of American Indians* (Monroe, ME, 1992), 119.
 84. Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920).
 85. Joseph Howard, *Strange Empire: Louis Riel and the Metis People* (Toronto, 1974), 136-37.
 86. See McMath, *American Populism*, 161-2.
 87. Ignatius Donnelly, *Caesar's Column* (Cambridge, 1960); for the description of Stanley, see 209-309. Painter, *Standing at Armageddon*, 66; A.L. Morton, *The English Utopia* (London, 1978), 229-32. Morton notes that Theodor Hertzka, in *Freeland* (published in the same year as Donnelly's work), also located a Utopia in East Africa. According to Morton, 'Both books . . . were written in the very years in which the British East Africa Co. was preparing the way for the formal annexation of the whole region', 232. Donnelly did not pick Uganda at random; he must have followed events in Africa closely.
 88. Kenneth P. Vickery, in "'Herrenvolk' Democracy and Egalitarianism in South Africa and the US South', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16 (1974), 309-28, makes a similar comparison to that made here between Populists and Voortrekkers, though his argument is confined to the US South during slavery and Reconstruction.
 89. Lamar and Thompson, *The Frontier in History*, 25.
 90. Unfortunately, none of the essays in the Lamar and Thompson volume discuss the issue of the similarities in political ideologies thrown up by the

- American and South African frontiers. Christopher Saunders does discuss the political conflict on the South African frontier, however, presenting some of the differences between Southern African and American frontiers. 'Political Processes in the Southern African Frontier Zones', 149-71.
91. *Ibid.*, 26.
 92. Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, eds, *A History of South Africa to 1870* (London, 1982), 407. Fredrickson employs three 'crucial variables' - demography, geography and the role of imperial power in South Africa; *White Supremacy*, xxi.
 93. Anne McClintock, 'Family Feuds', 69.
 94. Snow, *The Star Raft*, 47-53.
 95. Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa*, 28. These American literary conventions were evident in Donnelly's efforts to write Africans out of Africa.
 96. Hofstadter, *Age of Reform*, 50-1.
 97. Turner, 'Understanding Populists', 368. Ronald Takaki, *Iron Cages* (New York, 1979), 253.
 98. Trachtenberg, *Incorporation of America*, 27-34.
 99. Thus, if we are to join Alan Brinkley in seeing continuities in republican political tradition from the populists to the followers of Father Coughlin and Huey Long in the 1930s, we must do so bearing in mind both the critique of capitalism and the status anxiety inherited from the days of frontier expansion. Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression* (New York, 1983), 143-68.
 100. Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Indian Historiography Is Good to Think', in Nicholas B. Dirks, ed., *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor, 1992), 353-88.